2008: The Shakeout
My first seven posts have mostly been about my startup 1.0: IPI. For those of you just joining us, IPI got big, missed a chance to transition from services to products and became a lifestyle business that eventually went on the shelf so I could focus on something new. That “something new” was my statup 2.0: TIOTI.com.
It’s too early for me to distill any specific lessons from my time as co-founder at this thoroughly Web 2.0 startup. After all, I only stepped away from my full-time role a few weeks ago.
I do feel obliged to throw down a comment today, so that I can’t be accused of making it up later. I think 2008 is a year when startups should focus on doing real business. You know, the kind where people pay for a product, leading to revenue that pays the bills for rent, servers and staff.
This feeling started to take shape after I attended an entrepreneur’s dinner about a year ago in London sponsored by the (very) smart folks @ Alegro Capital. Paul Cautrecasas from Alegro used his time to make the point that a credit crisis was looming in US capital markets, and that startups should not count on “business as usual” for leveraged buyouts or investment until at least 2009/2010.
Man, was Paul’s prediction ever prescient…Here we are approaching the end of the first fiscal quarter of 2008, and the sub-prime mortgage meltdown in America is starting to affect the economy in general.
When I founded my first startup, I was pretty naïve about the mechanics of big business and I bet a lot of other young entrepreneurs are too. It certainly never occurred to me that companies use credit just like individuals do. And when that credit gets squeezed, businesses can’t do some of the things they want even if they make strategic sense. (Heck, even some familar names can’t do business as usual.)
A lot of the Web 2.0 hype (I won’t call it a “bubble” yet) seems to be based on the idea that startups should build audience because because companies will sweep in to acquire — big business that already know how to turn audiences into revenue. The $64 million question — literally, for some startups with a valuation in this neighborhood — is whether the pool of potential acquirers will winnow down when they can’t go to their corporate credit vehicles to fund M&A activity.
My opinion on the subject is clear. 2008 will be a tough time for startups to be acquired.
So what should a good startup do? Either bank a bunch of extra cash, because it does seem to be out there, and wait for a new U.S. president and (hopefully) a reinvigorated America. Or start working now on strategic deals and advertising & sponsorships unless the plan is to have staff working for free in ‘08.
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